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The world has clearly been experiencing a serious financial and economic crisis, commencing  in summer 
2007 and continuing into the present, causing trillions in financial losses, significant economic 
contraction, and higher global unemployment and state held  debts, the effects of which may continue 
well into the future, and which provokes many significant theoretical and practical ‘lessons’(Gills 2008). 
This global ‘capitalist crisis’ reflects both the intrinsic and the periodic nature of such crises in the 
‘natural history’ of capitalist development (Minsky, Marx, Keynes, Polanyi, Galbraith) and while 
revealing the underlying social malaise, systemic risk, structural imbalances, and dynamic dis-
equilibrium within ‘globalised and financialised capitalism’, also presents a moment for deeper 
reflection and the potential for vigorous reform, renewal and transformation.  
The causes of the present global capitalist crisis are structural and long term. The origins of the financial 
crisis may be traced to the 1970s and the ‘capital logic’ and global restructuring that expresses the 
attempt by capital to circumvent the limits to capital accumulation imposed in the old core societies, in 
order to raise the rate of profit. This took the form of the globalization of production, the financialisation 
of capital and the globalization of finance, and was accompanied by economic doctrines emphasizing the 
‘self-regulation’ of capital and markets. However, by ‘solving’ one problem, these measures created 
others, including: intensification of global asymmetries, social polarization and inequality; ‘uneven 
development’ both within and between regions, generating serious structural imbalances such as 
between deficit and surplus country accounts; a ‘global underconsumption’ tendency (caused by raising 
the rate of the global exploitation of labour and increasing the ratio of value appropriated by capital vis 
a vis labour on a global basis); and accelerating environmental destruction and the impending global 
climate change scenario; thus overall increasing the level of systemic instability and the ‘systemic risk’ 
within the world system as a whole. 
In the present financial and economic crisis, the process has progressed from a liquidity crisis (which is 
also a solvency crisis), to the ‘paradox of thrift’ (where everyone anticipates a negative trend and so 
everyone cuts back on spending and investment simultaneously, including banks, businesses, and 
consumers), and so to the inevitable consequence of a deepening syndrome of economic contraction 
(swift, global, and synchronized), to the massive state interventions and global bail-out of the financial 
system and the various programmes of fiscal stimulus (roughly calculated at present at a combined total 
of some 15 trillion US dollars, which exceeds the annual GDP of the United States of America), and thus 
to ballooning public budget deficits and mounting government debt, falling into a new ‘debt trap’ with 
the present and possibly intensifying fiscal crisis of the state(s) (including even some hitherto very 
prosperous and large economies, as well as many small and vulnerable ones), and the onset of a public 
discourse and politics of deficit and debt reduction, with retrenchment and savage cut-backs in public 
spending programmes, which will have the effect of further deepening the economic contraction, 
increasing unemployment  and ‘bad’ debt , worsening the fiscal crisis, and perhaps leading to a second 
economic contraction and second ‘financial bil-out’ and public recapitalization of the banking system, 
and thereby producing deepening social conflict and radicalization (and not all progressive in content). 
This scenario, and the actual historical precedents of the Great Depression era, leads us to expect not a 
quick and easy ‘V’ pattern of global recovery and growth in employment, but rather a multiple ‘W’ or 
‘double dip’ pattern, or the ‘L’, the ‘long slump’, or both. The crisis is not over. The present global 
governing elite and the dominant global financial interests (to whom they are often directly allied) offer 
only a temporary ‘technical fix’ to the crisis, and the prospect of improved ‘global financial regulation’, 
but they seem to have no real intention (at least in the G8 and now G20 circle) of conducting any truly 
radical reform or transformation of the system itself. Indeed, the rhetoric of global regulatory reform is 
but a legitimating fig leaf for a return to business as usual, and the substance of such reform as is being 
discussed is even now being watered down before any actual reform is implemented.  
 We have already learned from the recent financial and economic crisis that when market systems fail 
they can fail spectacularly, but when globalised markets fail, they may fail even more spectacularly, 
more swiftly, deeply, and more synchronously (Gills 2008, Eichengreen and O’Rourke 2009). Moreover, 
the world seems to have (re) learned the lesson, that when such a catastrophic scale of market failure 
occurs (which is also a state failure for allowing this situation to happen in the first place, Wolf 2009), 
then only the state(s) have the capacity to save the capitalist system (from itself) and restore some 
manner of stability, through large scale intervention.  Perhaps we are now still learning that, once 
having invoked massive state intervention in the market system in order to repair and sustain it, it is 
extremely difficult to know when or how to withdraw the stimulus measures and the extensive public 
support given to the financial system, for fear of causing the real economy to revert to contraction, or 
be plunged into new perils of perpetually high debt repayment and/or high inflation.i  
It is also a lesson of this present financial and economic crisis that those analysts (particularly 
economists) who relied excessively on abstract formal mathematical models to predict or understand 
the conditions that produced this crisis, were in a weaker position to do so accurately than those who 
have relied on broader interpretative historical, comparative, and social science based approaches 
(Krugman 2009). The ultimate analytical questions raised by this acute historic crisis situation are, 
however, through praxis, intimately bound up with the practical and political responses we make to this 
crisis. The point is not simply to analyse the causes of world crisis, or simply to see its unfolding patterns, 
but to use such analysis to interpret what must be done to profoundly correct the historical sources of 
the danger and to guide practice to this end, with a sense of real historical urgency. 
 I will argue in this paper that the present financial and economic crisis, or ‘capitalist crisis’, despite its 
great importance, is but one aspect of a much larger and overarching crisis in our present historical 
world system. This larger ‘world system crisis’ includes not only the financial and economic crisis of the 
globalised capitalist system of production and of capital accumulation, but also a ‘global centre shift’ in 
the locus of production and accumulation of capital, and an on-going ‘hegemonic transition’ in the 
hierarchical structure of the organization of political power and its relation to the global structure of 
accumulation.  Moreover, these profound changes in world system structure are now accompanied by a 
unique historic ‘comprehensive environmental crisis’, reflecting the real ‘ limits of capital’ and of the 
commodification of nature, and acutely involving the global food, fuel, and water systems supporting all 
human life on earth. 
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 The now apparent weakening of US hegemonic power (Niblitz 2009, and see 
Hoogvelt and Munck in this issue), the theoretical and practical failures of the hegemonic doctrine of 
‘neoliberal economic globalization’ and ‘market fundamentalism’, and the possibility of potentially 
catastrophic political failures by the existing Westphalian states system and the United Nations system 
to decisively address the multiple aspects of  global  crisis, are likewise central aspects of the present 
world systemic crisis. These challenges are nothing less than momentous, and go well beyond the 
managerial and technical elite’s responses to ‘fix’ the ‘credit crunch’ and restore growth to the global 
economic system.  
The first section of this paper will discuss the meaning of ‘crisis’ as an analytical concept, and the nature 
of ‘capital’ and its relation to crisis, via understanding the historical dialectics of capital and capitalism. 
The paper will then proceed to summarise a general theory of world systemic crisis, drawn from 
extensive prior analysis of world historical patterns, and conclude with an analysis of how this general 
theory may be applied to understanding the present global crises,  and deployed to develop concrete 
social and political responses that, by addressing the fundamental underlying and long term causes of 
the present global crisis, may not only solve some its acute problems but move the human community 
towards a new and transformed world historical social system.  
 
‘Crisis’ and historical system structure 
 
The term ‘crisis’ has many meanings, including the original Greek sense of a medical situation in which 
the patient can either progress and regenerate back to  health, or regress and succumb to more acute 
illness or even death,  and in the Chinese language, involves a combined sense of ‘danger’ and 
‘opportunity’. The standard Oxford English language dictionary defines crisis to include the sense of a 
‘turning point’ or a ‘decisive stage; a time of trouble, danger or suspense in politics, commerce, etc.’ 
(Oxford 1993). The classical Marxist concept of ‘crisis’ refers to a moment in the historical process of 
capital accumulation, when the internal contradictions of the process generate a serious set of obstacles 
to its continuation, unless some important alterations in social and technological factors are created.  I 
will invoke here the broader sense of a historical materialist understanding of ‘crisis’, in which the 
primary idea is a lack of ‘correspondence’ or effective functional unity, between the underlying material 
processes and structures, and the  overarching political and ideational forms and structures that 
together make up a whole historical social system. This type of understanding of crisis, as the absence of 
‘coherent conjunction’ between ideas, institutions, and material forces, and how this dialectic operates 
in world historical structures  (Cox 1981, Hoogvelt  in this issue) does not presume that ‘economics’ 
determines ideology or politics, as in crude versions of Marxism,  but rather focuses our attention on the 
fluid and mutually constitutive relations of material and ideational structures, and the dynamics of dis-
equilibrium  between them and the ‘coherence’ of historical structures.  
From this perspective, a crisis occurs when the overarching ideational forms, institutions and structures 
of the ensemble of social(ietal)  relations no longer correspond to and/or function effectively or 
coherently with the underpinning material processes and structures.  This lack of correspondence and 
coherence generates a very high level of tension between the structures, thus destabilizing the whole 
system. A situation of a historically deep seated and persistent dysfunctional relationship between the 
constituent structures of a historical social system or ‘historical structure’ (Cox 1981) is a central 
characteristic of a world systemic crisis. Such a crisis can only be resolved by some fundamental change 
or transformation which restores correspondence and coherence.  In temporal terms, this type of 
historical change may occur over very long time frames, involving generations, or even centuries. In 
terms of spatial dimensions, we are positing these relations over very large scales of organization, with 
particular focus on the idea of a ‘world system’ (Gills and Frank 1990, 1992, Frank and Gills 1993), which 
in the present day context, has become truly global.  
Thus, such crises are profound in their scope and consequences and tend to involve virtually all aspects 
of the social ensemble of relations that constitute the historical social system.  They are at once a 
structural crisis and a paradigmatic crisis, for every social system has an underlying set of mentalities, 
norms, values, etc, internalized, normalized, institutionalized, and legitimized,  without which they 
cannot functioniii A crisis calls into question these previous mentalities and the social relations they 
correspond to and reproduce, thus opening up the possibility of a ‘loss of faith’ in the old ways of 
thinking and understanding about the world, and therefore a potential  radicalization of human 
consciousness, capable of profoundly changing the ideational aspects of social relations.  Such a 
weakening of the old mentalities, and a radicalization of human thought, may be the direct product of 
the situation in which ordinary people are confronted by a cognitive and practical impasse in which the 
old ideas and the old solutions to the problems they face no longer work, i.e. the problems cannot be 
solved within the confines of the existing paradigm. This failure of the previous set of ideas, institutions, 
and forms provokes the need for new thought and new solutions, i.e. provokes a historical opening in 
which radically new ideas may emerge and take root in new social realities.  In the wider sense, this 
’paradigm shift’ in human mentality and all that flows from it is at the center of a world historical system 
crisis, and crucial to the outcome. 
 
‘Capital’, Crisis, and the Historical Dialectics of Capital 
 In terms of the sources of dynamic dis-equilibrium and change in social system structure generated by 
the social relations of ‘capital’ understood as a ‘value form’ and as a form of social relations rather than 
as a ‘thing’ (Marx, Capital, Vol 1), the central historical tensions, or ‘contradictions’ in the capitalist 
system can be viewed as being of two main types (both intimately inter-related) ; between, on the one 
hand, the social production of wealth and its private appropriation as surplus or capital, and on the 
other, the tension (or lack of ‘correspondence’) between the organization of wealth though an 
increasingly transnational or globalised logic of capital accumulation, and the appropriation or 
organization of this wealth though the continuation and reproduction of the territorially bounded 
‘nation-state’.  Crisis is an inherent, internally generated, structural and historical tendency of the 
capitalist system (Minsky 1982), and intrinsic in the value form of capital itself, as a social relation 
(Marx). Both capital and capitalism have the inherent tendency not only to produce periodic and even 
frequent systemic crises, but also to undermine or even destroy the very basis of their own social 
reproduction. In this sense, capital is its own worst enemy, especially if left to pursue capital logic 
unrestrained by countervailing social forces or alternatives. 
The historical dialectics of capital and capitalist development entail a process by which every move 
forward by capital, for example through the dissolving of solidaristic or communal forms of social 
existence, de-socialising, commodifying and alienating labour and nature, also provokes a response, 
dialectically, as Karl Polanyi argued (in relation to marketisation of society) of countervailing self-
protective and socially reproductive action by social forces, and via the state form (though no 
progressive alliance between these should be assumed, but has to be a conscious product of collective 
action in the struggle to gain control or exercise power vis a vis capital in the state terrain).  Viewed 
historically, ‘capital’ requires social re-stabilisation, re-socialisation, de’commodification, and dis-
alienating processes, through solidaristic and communal ethos, policy, and praxis- at all levels of society 
and social existence, in order to continue to exist at all or be reconciled within a larger social system.  
Therefore, the construction by society of these counter-vailing forces in response to the expanded 
reproduction of capital and capital accumulation on a world scale are historically intrinsic to the process 
of capitalist development itself, and in fact account for its continued ‘success’. The construction of 
alternatives to ‘raw’ capital logic, and the construction of ‘socialism’, is an intrinsic aspect of the history 
of capitalism and the historical dialectics of ‘capital’ versus ‘oikos’ (Gills 2002, 2003, Gills and Denemark 
2008, 2009), and this process has not ended, but still continues, and in fact, is at present more urgent 
and necessary than at any time in recent world history.  
Conversely, the removal or destruction of such countervailing forms by their dissolution and subjection 
to capital logic, the unleashing of the unfettered forces of capital upon the world - such as we have 
witnessed in recent decades  (Gills 2000) - automatically increases the destructive and self-destabilising 
tendencies of capital, and thus generates the conditions for a severe systemic crisis and also for an 
overall implosion of the world system.
iv
 This is the real lesson of the present global systemic crisis of 
capitalism, understood as a world system crisis. The situation of such a crisis can only effectively be 
rectified by addressing the underlying structural and root causes of the crisis, by strengthening and 
restoring the solidaristic and communal ethos (the ‘oikos’ form) and its countervailing forces and 
practices, but this time on a truly global level.  
 
The General Theory of World Systemic Crisis 
 
Traditionally, long historical ‘cycles of accumulation’ in the economic sphere and ‘cycles of hegemony’ in 
the political or international sphere, have been viewed as being tightly interwoven, mutually interacting 
patterns, though theories vary considerably as to the exact nature or causal relations and outcomes of 
this relationship.
v
  These phenomena also represent real forms of the relations of social power, for 
example, between those who own and control the means to produce wealth , and those who do not, 
and between those who command the authority of state power, locally, nationally, or globally, and 
those who do not.   
As argued at the outset of this paper, a periodic crisis of capital accumulation, as important as this may 
be, is but one aspect of a world systemic crisis, among which are also a ‘centre-shift’ in the locus of the 
production of wealth and of capital accumulation (on a world system scale), and a ‘hegemonic 
transition’ in which the previously prevailing hierarchy of power and wealth is giving way to a far-
reaching reorganization. One aspect of such a hegemonic reorganization may be a system ‘implosion’, 
whereby areas that were previously less powerful or even ‘peripheral’ in relation to the ‘core’ or ‘centre’ 
powers, may change position and ascend in the hierarchy, as the old core powers weaken and succumb 
to internal forces of entropy and external competition.
vi
  It was of course the starting point of the 
traditions of Dependency theory and World-System analysis that in the situation of a major capitalist 
systemic crisis (as in the 1930s) it was possible for peripheral countries (the terminology  ‘periphery’ in 
relation to a ‘core’ or ‘center’ country was first introduced by Raul Prebisch, and later deployed in the 
neo-Marxist tradition, initially in the analysis of Paul Baran, then by Andre Gunder Frank, and others to 
gain increased autonomy and to accelerate and deepen their own ‘national development’ pattern.  The 
point to remember here is that world systemic crises involve the possibility of quite important changes 
and reorganization in the prevailing hierarchical organization of wealth and power in the world system, 
where old core powers may in fact ‘descend’ and ‘rising powers’ may ‘ascend’ 
vii
(See Arrighi, and Chase- 
Dunn and Hall).   
This article will attempt to understand and interpret the present world crisis, in economic, political, 
environmental and social spheres, within a long term world historical context, and from the perspective 
of a general theory of the causes and consequences of periodic ‘world system crises’.
viii
  In order to 
summarise this general theory of world systemic crisis, I ask the reader to bear with me, while I cite a 
summation of the theory written in 1992, in an essay entitled “Hegemonic Transitions in the World 
System” (Gills 1993) 
“To conclude, a shift to “hegemonic transition”  as the central organizing concept of world history 
suggests some general hypotheses on the causes of periodic crises. Above all, the primary theme in 
these crises is always the overall character of the struggle for the control of the surplus.  The key factors 
in the onset of crises include the following:    
an excessive rate of the extraction of surplus (overextraction); 
an excessive concentration of control over capital (overconcentration); 
a failure of demand or expansion to stimulate growth (underconsumption); 
and a failure of investment in productive capacity (underinvestment) 
which may be reflected in the growth of elite consumption relative to social redistribution and 
productive investment – but is always “parasitic appropriation” as opposed to productive investment of 
capital. The above are often accompanied by a fiscal crisis of the state and a crisis of political authority. 
The end result is economic contraction and political fragmentation or dislocation, often accompanied by 
rebellion and war. 
The general world system crisis occurs when the combined cumulative layers of contradictions in the 
world system cannot any longer be sustained by the existing social, economic, and political 
arrangements of the world order – thus necessitating drastic transformation. The interaction of all the 
cycles in the system and the simultaneous occurrence of crises in conjunctural moments generate a high 
disequilibrium within the world system, which destabilizes the whole. This disequilibrium is present in 
both the sphere of world trade and the sphere of political-military power. A shift in both the locus of 
accumulation and of hegemonic power in the world system is the result. This process is accompanied by 
economic, social, and political upheavals and usually by wars. A dramatic world hegemonic transition is 
thus both the result and the resolution of a general world crisis. It is a resolution in the sense that the 
old world order is eventually destroyed and conditions are laid down for the emergence of a new world 
order. Out of a crisis of accumulation comes the restored conditions for an expansion of accumulation 
and a new hegemonic order.  
Most importantly, these concepts seem as relevant to today’s global economic crisis and on-going world 
hegemonic reorganization as they are to 5,000 years of world system history. “ 
(Gills 1993) 
 
‘Entropy’, ‘Implosion’ and Crisis 
There are two aspects of world systemic crisis in relation to processes of ‘entropy’. First, there is the 
change in hierarchy in the international order. This pattern takes place in relations between failing and 
declining ‘old’ core states, and ‘rising’ or dynamic expansionist forces, which were previously  positioned 
on the perimeter, the periphery, or the margins of the system. Arnold Toynbee in his magisterial Study 
of History (Toynbee 19 xx) observed a pattern of systemic ‘implosion’ whereby the established hierarchy 
of the old states system weakened, became unstable, and gave way to a new ordering, in which the 
former peripheral powers moved into the centre, took command, displacing the old elite and 
reorganized the system, restoring dynamism to the historical civilization. Toynbee used the examples of 
ancient China and Greece to illustrate this pattern. At the end of the ‘warring states’ period in China, the 
old powers and elites of the centre give way to the rising power of the Qin state, which was situated on 
the western margins of the system in the Wei river valley, with their bureaucratic state, legalistic 
philosophy of power, and peasant based professional standing army. The ‘first emperor’ Qin Shi Wang 
Di, founded the first great unified Chinese state and civilization. In Greek history, the once ‘barbarian’  
Macedonians from the march lands eventually overcame all the older fractious city states of the Greek 
interstate system, and founded a new expansive civilization and empire, extending over vast areas of 
Asia, India, and Egypt , known as the Hellenistic civilization.  Another major theorist of these historical 
patterns of ‘implosion’ and civilisational crisis and renewal  was Ibn Khaldun  (1332-1406), who in his 
pathbreaking prolegomenon to a universal history (the Muqaddimah) (Khaldun, 1967) analyses a 
general world historical pattern, in which old urban centres of power and civilization decay but are 
reinvigorated through an implosion of power relations, in which peoples from the rural and tribal 
hinterlands inject the dynamic spirit of sociability, asabiyya , (which derives from the intrinsic nature of 
their social relations)resolving ‘civilisational crisis’ and providing for a new period of dynamism, 
creativity and wealth creation (See also Pasha, and Murphy, this issue).ix 
The other aspect of ‘entropy’ is internal to class and social relations, in particular of the declining and 
failing old core states in the system, and may in my analysis be seen as the fundamental cause of their 
decline and weakening.  I refer here to long term and cumulative patterns in class relations of the 
concentration of property, wealth, and capital, or ‘over-concentration’ of wealth.  This concentration is 
aided or facilitated through state power, and processes whereby the wealthy elite succeed in gaining 
and wielding state power in their own (narrow) class interest, and use it to intensify such concentration. 
This is related to a process of ‘aristocratisation’ of the state, which may also be seen as a form of 
ossification.  Another way of putting this is that the state form becomes more ‘patrician’ in terms of the 
class holding state power and also of its fundamental value system and character. As this process 
deepens, the state is itself fully captured by this power concentration, from ‘within’, and becomes 
increasingly weakened by the process, especially in terms of its ability to undertake meaningful 
structural and adaptive reform to meet new challenges, and to provide the needed infrastructural 
investment to maintain the stability of the overall historical structure.  
The typical historical pattern, as outlined above in the quoted passage on the general theory of world 
crisis, is one in which the overconcentration of wealth becomes increasingly structural and allied to state 
power, and the effect is to increase the extraction of wealth from the ‘base’, i.e. the ‘over-extraction’ of 
surplus, while the tax base for the state concomitantly shrinks (as the rich pay less and less taxes) and 
displaces the burden of revenue onto the ‘base’.  This syndrome leads to gross ‘over-exploitation’ of 
labour and the gradual impoverishment or immiseration of the mass base of society (the producers, the 
workers, the peasantry, the ‘lower classes’, etc), and thus to a spiral of stagnation and eventual 
economic contraction. This resembles ‘underconsumption’ theory of course, because it represents a 
transhistorical pattern where the ‘circulating’ wealth within the historical structure is increasingly 
restricted to a narrow class circle.  
Eventually, the state finds itself in a fiscal crisis, which becomes increasingly prolonged and severe, 
unable to raise sufficient revenue from either the rich or the poor, and thus unable to properly fulfill its 
necessary functions of infrastructural investment. This situation is therefore one of ‘under-investment in 
productive processes’ which allows the productive capacity to atrophy and removes dynamism from the 
system. The overall situation is one of ‘parasitic accumulation’ and the increase of conspicuous elite 
consumption of the surplus relative to its socially useful investment, and these aspects taken altogether, 
in an assemblage or ensemble of social relations, generate a syndrome of gradual and inexorable 
economic and social decline.  But this decline may not be universal, i.e. there may be competitor zones, 
social structures and state powers who will take advantage of this weakening of the old and rival 
centre(s) of power. Sometimes the rising power(s) is/are a former subordinate dependency or tributary 
of  the old centre, and in this sense, their challenge to the old hegemonic structure is also an act of 
rebellion. The rebellion against the old elite and their power and wealth is also in some cases from the 
‘lower classes’ within, who may desire more freedom and a chance at renewed prosperity and a stable 
and more just social order.   
The ‘fall of the Roman empire’ was depicted in Latin texts, written reflecting the enormous influence of 
the catholic church in later centuries, as a catastrophe and chaos, the end of ‘civilisation’ and the onset 
of ‘the dark ages’. Revisionist interpretations however, argue that the decline and fall of the Roman 
empire in the West was not a sudden and great descent from civilization to barbarism. What happened 
was a breaking up of the centralized state apparatus into a fragmented set of new states, typically 
founded by ‘hinterland’ peoples, who in many cases had already been assimilated into Roman 
civilization, and who injected a dose of ‘ Germanic Freedom’ into the decadent and decaying Roman 
social, economic and political structure. Rome had long since succumbed to the processes I have 
described above, in every respect.  Rome’s fall was a classic entropy situation and systemic implosion, in 
both internal social class and ‘external’ centre-periphery relations. It was replaced by a new civilization 
in Europe and a new world order, in which the dynamism was injected by the movement of formerly 
oppressed, exploited, and marginalized peoples into the centres of power. 
 
‘Globalization’, the Global Crisis, and the Radical Politics of Transformation 
It should by now be quite obvious to the reader where this argument is leading us.  Historical insight is 
useful to analyse the present. I am clearly arguing that the present global crisis, in its larger aspect as a 
‘civilisational crisis’ and a ‘systemic implosion’ remarkably conforms to the outline of the general theory 
of system crisis outlined above. The decline of the United States of America in our era mirrors the 
processes in the general theory. The long term structural and social class based causes of the recent 
spectacular financial and economic crash of Wall Street and the US economy in my view conform 
remarkably to the general world historical pattern of these phenomena. The concentration of wealth in 
the United States, the capture of state power by the wealthy and the financial oligarchy, the deliberate 
collusion of venal politicians and media corporations to deceive and over-exploit, and eventually ruin, 
not only the American people, but labour across the world system as a whole, the economic decline and 
demise of the ‘competitiveness’ of the US economy as these processes proceeded to deepen through 
‘neoliberal economic globalisation’ and the ‘out- sourcing’ and ‘off-shoring’ of production and wealth, 
the enormous and systematic tax evasion by the rich, especially the American financial and corporate 
oligarchy, the eventual  collapse of the pyramid of debt (banking, corporate, individual, and state) and 
the onset of a severe financial and economic contraction, the ever worsening fiscal crisis of the state and 
the inability to raise the funds necessary to reinvigorate infrastructure, while passing the burden of all 
these pressures increasingly onto the ‘base’ and thereby immiserating them, and yes, the inexorable 
loss of hegemonic power by the old power and its inevitable challenge and replacement by ‘rising 
powers’ in what can correctly be called a global ‘centre’shift’ in the locus of wealth, and the power that 
goes with it, and thus a ‘hegemonic transition’ of historic proportions and long lasting fundamental 
impact on world order. Yes, the present global crisis is certainly all of these.  
A great historic crisis, a civilisational and world systemic crisis, is also, as I have tried to outline, a time of 
the weakening of old ideas, old certainties, and old paradigms, i.e. a change of understanding our place 
in the world and how we make it. Ibn Khaldun understood this process perhaps before any modern 
theorist of the West did. What it teaches us today is that, as the Chinese character for crisis conveys, a 
crisis is not just a danger, but an opportunity.  Change will come, that is inevitable, a law of nature and a 
reflection of the nature of the universe. Change in this context, however, is social, unlike in the laws of 
physics. Social change is inevitable in a great social crisis. This change comes from ‘within’ and expresses 
the mounting and multilayered social tensions and contradictions of the social hierarchy itself, which are 
no longer containable or resolvable within the norms or forms of the old system structure. Change also 
comes from ‘without’ , i.e. is generated by the interactions of the contending power blocs and social 
forces of the historical world system, and which is ‘resolved’ by a radical reordering of the pre-existing 
hierarchy, and often thereby also of the whole set of underlying values, forms, institutions, and ‘policies’ 
that go with a hegemonic world order.  
So whence will come, or should come that needed radical impetus to genuine necessary change or 
transformation, that change which will addresses the long term and root causes of the present 
comprehensive global and world systemic crisis? Not from capital certainly, nor from corporate versions 
of ‘social responsibility’, or even from corporatized versions of the ‘Green New Deal’
x
.  Rather, it will, in 
my view, emerge from and take form through the re-building, with historical urgency, of those 
countervailing forces  animated by a solidaristic ethos, those political social responses that will explicitly 
seek to effectively ‘discipline capital’ again, those ideas and transformations that will seek to restore 
correspondence and balance in the historical structure between the material forces and the ideational 
structure, and those that will seek to politically and collectively redirect the uses of social wealth to 
promote the necessary social and productive purposes. In effect, the remedy and resolution to a great 
historic general crisis, to the crisis of ‘entropy’, resides in the reversal of its underlying causes- i.e. 
overconcentration, over-exploitation, underinvestment, ’parasitic appropriation’  and ‘parasitic 
accumulation’.  Any other ‘reform’ is ultimately ineffective.  Mere ‘financial regulation’ alone will 
certainly not solve this crisis, and not the imposition of temporary taxes on grotesque bankers bonuses.
xi
  
Without a profound redistribution of wealth and a very substantial reduction of the concentration of 
property, without a substantial strengthening of the fundamental rights of labour and of working people 
to a decent and living wage as well as to employment itself, without wide spread forgiveness and relief 
of debts, especially for the poorest countries but also for the poor and working people of the richest 
countries themselves, without a genuine reinvigoration of the people’s sovereignty and real democracy 
and a profound change in the use of state power, without a wholesale revival of the state’s role to 
protect and provide for the sustained social security and stability of all its people, without such 
profound and historic changes, the crisis will not be over, but will persist, and very possibly deepen. 
 
What is needed now is not a retreat into despair, defeatism, or misguided philosophical idealism (Pugh, 
in this issue) which serve only to immobilize even the possibility of effective action. But rather a full 
embracing of the urgent necessity of radical action, and this action is the source of future global 
transformation.  ‘Globalization’, as expressed through capital logic, neoliberalism, and (decaying) 
American hegemony, has inexorably brought about the present global crisis. Global Crisis, in turn, brings 
about the prospect of historical transformation, of change, of a transition to a new social historical 
structure, of a renewal of historic dynamism, through the reorganization of a civilization in crisis. Given 
our now globalized world, however, this change is only truly possible, in these historical circumstances, 
by constructing global, transnational, and post-national social solidarities, and by directing these to a 
clear common purpose. Such change includes the de-commodification of nature, before the forces of 
destruction of the environment through the logic of global capitalism overwhelm and destroy the very 
basis and fabric of life on this planet.  Such change will come through the decommodification of labour, 
in which ‘labour’ will again be recognized as a living human person, who is much more than a mere 
‘commodity’ in the logic of production and capital accumulation, and who has the inherent and 
inviolable right to human dignity and human freedom (Khan 2009), not as an isolated individual ‘island’ 
but as a thoroughly social being, with a multitude of social obligations to family, community, society, 
and nature. And such change will come through the process of re-socialising the basis of wealth creation 
and collectively and politically redirecting the uses of wealth (which is ultimately ‘social’, contra the 
capitalist ideology of private property rights and capital accumulation) to once again serve the general 
interest and the welfare of all in society, and not just the privileged and powerful  few. 
The emergence of new and radical forms of global politics with the conscious intention of transforming 
global governance and the existing global economic system on a radically democratic basis, operating 
through and transforming the historically embryonic forms of transnational social action and world 
polity formation, is now an urgent historical necessity, perhaps a matter of human survival( Patomaki, 
and Falk, in this issue) . Without such transformatory action through new social solidarities, including at 
the global or transnational level, the negative tendencies and destructive effects of the on-going global 
systemic crisis will continue into the future, and may take on increasingly pathological and self-
destructive forms, thus threatening the peace and security of all nations. The spectre of the politics of 
the 1930s, and the rise of fascist, militarist, racist, authoritarian and imperialist forces to the fore, 
cannot be lightly dismissed, and it is an urgent political challenge to prevent this scenario from 
happening. Should the present financial and economic crisis, as I expect, be prolonged and deepen, then 
this will become even more an acute political urgency. But even should the present economic crisis 
begin to ease in the short term, many other aspects of the long term set of historical structural tensions 
in this world system crisis will remain and continue.  
The return to the global status quo ante before 2007 is not an option, theoretically or practically. The 
underlying and long term structural systemic patterns of this global crisis include the global centre shift, 
the hegemonic transition, and the comprehensive environmental crisis and its limits to capital and to 
urban-industrial world civilization as we have known it.  The ‘solutions’ to this crisis must be radical and 
transformatory, and they should, most importantly, come from the people of the world themselves, 
who by their lived experiences, will realize the danger they are in and combine to create new forms of 
effective and collective action. There is no other solution. 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
i
  At the time of writing in late December 2009 there was mounting evidence of a prolonged economic crisis, 
including: The Bank of England announced that it would continue its ‘quantitative easing’ and ultra low interest 
rate (0.5%) policy; unemployment in the US and in the EU continued to either rise or hover at near 10%, with little 
sign of increasing employment; the G20 finance ministers agreed to continue the fiscal stimulus programmes; 
Japan announced yet another new fiscal stimulus package, as companies cut back investment and cautiously 
guarded their cash positions, while Japan’s ratio of government debt to GDP neared 200% (and Greece’s  debt 
sparked  alarm about the stability of the euro); China announced a tightening of the reins over banks’ behavior as 
suspicion rose of a new speculative bubble in the Hong Kong and Shanghai financial markets, while simultaneously 
moving to beef up its already over 1 trillion US dollar support for the financial system; US Federal Reserve 
chairman Ben Bernanke publicly warned that US recovery may not be sustainable, while US Secretary of the 
Treasury Tim Geithner testified before Congress that the US recovery was fragile and requested an extension of 
the  TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Programme) of 350 billion dollars into 2010, after it was due by law to expire ; the 
ECB announced that it would be premature to predict a sustainable recovery in Europe, but hinted it would slowly 
retract some of the existing financial support measures, even while the government bond market in the debts of 
the so-called ‘PIIGS’- i.e. Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, indicated a possible sovereign debt crisis in the 
EU and beyond, thus provoking woories of renewed financial crisis; and the speculative bubble of real estate 
developers  in Dubai finally burst, exposing some 60 billion dollars of debt outstanding by the state owned 
property development company, Dubai World, as Dubai asked for a temporary moratorium on debt repayment 
and the federal government of the UAE initially refused to guarantee these debts, setting off a local stock market 
tumble. 
ii
  For the podcast of the Public Forum on Global Crisis: Food, Fuel and Finance, held at New York University, Stern 
School, on 18 February, 2009, see: ……., and for an analysis of the ‘converging crises’ of food, fuel, finance and 
climate change, see Susan George, forthcoming. 
iii
  See the works of Mircea Eliade, Joseph Campbell, and Herbert Marcuse for perspectives on the role of myth in 
human social organization. 
iv
 For further discussion of the present world system implosion, global centre shift and hegemonic transition and 
the rise of the ‘South’ see: Barry K Gills “Going South: capitalist crisis, systemic crisis, civilisational crisis”, 
forthcoming, Third World Quarterly, 2010. 
v
  The literature relating to this theme is too extensive to cite in detail, but I refer the reader to major studies in this 
area by Joshua Goldstein, Christopher Chase Dunn and Thomas Hall, George Modelski and William R. Thompson, 
and Frank and Gills. 
vi
  I refer the reader to classic studies that analyse world historical patterns of entropy and system implosion, 
including those by Martin Wight (Power Politics; Systems of States), Arnold Toynbee, (A Study of History) and Ibn 
Khaldun, (The Muqaddimah) 
vii
 See works by Giovanni Arrighi on ascent in the world system(Adam Smith in Beijing), and by Chase Dunn and 
Thomas Hall (Rise and Demise) 
viii
 A general theory is not a theory of everything. Rather, it is constructed from a large scale study of many 
concrete and historical instances or cases, and attempts to summarise from these a set of general hypotheses, 
which in turn may be useful in the further examination and interpretation of any single or individual case or 
example. In the case of this general theory of world system crises, the study was based upon several years of 
intensive reading of world history, for all major regions and civilizations of the world and over a period of several 
millennia of history.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ix
 For a much more in depth and extensive discussion on interstate systems and world order, reviewing several 
traditions in the disciplines of world history, Sociology, and International Relations, see Barry Gills, xxxx in Leon 
Mangasarian and Hugh Dyer, International Relations: The State of the Art, Macmillan/Palgrave, 199x) 
 
x
 See analysis of the many contending versions of the green new deal by Elmar Altvater, forthcoming. 
 
xi
  British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy jointly announced in the Wall Street 
Journal in December 2009 that global finance means global regulation, a and put forward the proposal of a 
temporary 50% tax on bankers bonuses in both countries, citing that given the substantial public funds that had 
been given to the banks, and their lack of profound changes in their behavior, either to adequately increase 
lending especially to small and medium sized businesses or to curtail their obscene private bonus pools, justified 
such taxation, but to be truly effective, such measures would have to be international. 
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